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WEST VIRGINLI L;tW QJIRTERLY
REASONABLE. DOUBT UNDER THE NON-SUPPORT
ACT IN' WEST VMRGINIA*
BY C. NT. CAIMPBELL**
In. a recent 'enactment passed by the West Virginia Legis,
lature; commonly called the "Non-support Act"1 the follow-
ing appearg as part of Section 5:
"No other -or -greater evidence shall b.e required to
prove the -marriage of such husband and wife, or that
the defondant"Is the fathbr, or that thea alleged mother- is
the mother of suchi child or children, than is, or shall be
required. to.prove such facts in a civil action."
This act wamendb and re-enacts Chapter,51 of, the Acts of
1917; but the portion above -quoted appears in substantially
its -present-form aspart of-Section 6'of the former Att.
There can. be little doubt that .nonsupport, by this act,
is made a crime, although the "Justice, before, whom such
conviction is had, may, in lieu of 'the penalty herein pro-
videed,. or in addition thereto. 4 * * require the defendant
to pay a certain sum periodically to the wife * * and, to
release, the defendant" upon giving bond, etc. In, case
there is default in the payment the Justice may re-arrest
the defendant and "sentence him under the original
charge". All of the elements entering into the definition
of a crime are present here, except compulsory punishment
by fine or imprisonment on conviction; but it would seem
that the discretion given to a Justice to accept a proper
bond conditioned as the statute prescribes is in nature and
effect simply authority to him to parole the defendant on
condition that he make the periodical payments specified in
the bond. Non-support is by the act made a crime; it is
punishable by the state in a proceeding in its own name;
it is punishable even though the punishment may be sus-
pended under certain conditions.
* A paper read at the monthly luncheon of the Berkeley County Bar on May 8, 1928.
" Member of the Berkeley County Bar.I Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1925.
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The legislature :has in ,express terms provided that one
or more of the essential -elements of the crime of non-support
may be proved by a mere preponderance of the -evidence;
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" of such elements is not
required. 'In so providing, did the legislature transcend
its constitutional limitations?
The principle here involved is one of importance; if ,it is
within the power of the legislature to provide that this
particular crime may be proved by a mere ,preponderance
of the evidence, no reason is perceived why it may not-enact
a similar provision as to the degree of proof required for
conviction 6f -any aid all 0ther crimes, from murder ,and
rape down through the Whole -category to possession of
liquor. Such~a general law would revolutionize our crim-
inal procedure. Theoretically, at least, it would certainly
tend to make convictions easier for the prosecuting attorn-
ey; .and practically it would have the same effect, for it
would deprive counsel for the defendant of his chief weap-
on (which was intended rather as a shield than as a weap-
on),-The argument that there is a "reasonable doubt" in
the case; the argument what is a reasonable doubt? The
argument-is the doubt reasonable? -,Theoretically, these
arguments may be specious; practically, they give the juror
inclined to be swayed by sympathy for the defendant a
reason with which he may conibat the opposing views of
his fellow-jurors and which may very effectually salve his
conscience for voting to acquit in- a case in which to all
others the proof of guilt is -overwhelming.
We are not now concerned With the policy of such legis-
lation; we are interested only in its validity-its constitu-
tionality.
By a familiar rule, the legislature may enact any law
which does not violate a provision of 'the constitution and
does not destroy or tend to destroy or trench upon any
right guaranteed by the constitution. Therefore, When it
is contended that 9 particular act is unconstitutional, it
must be held constitutional unless a particular provision
can be found in the constitution which 'it violates or in-
fringes upon. The question therefore is:
"What particular provision of the constitution is violated
2
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by legislation that in a criminal case a defendant may be
convicted on no higher or greater degree of proof than is
required in civil cases?"
There are two, and as We view it, only two provisions in
our constitution which could possibly have any bearing on
this question; namely, the "due process of law" provision
(Sec. 14 of Article 3).
(1) "No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty
or property, without due process of law and the judgment
of his peers."
In a West Virginia Case2 the court, speaking through
Judge Green heid that the word "aid" in this section is
to be read "or"; so that the section is to be interpreted as if
it read:
"No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or
property without due process of law or the judgment of
his peers."
Volumes have been written on what is due process of
law; the definitions are as unsatisfactory as the definitions
of reasonable doubt. As applied to the question in hand
and in trying to ascertain whether permitting a crime to
be proved by a mere preponderance of evidence is a denial
of due process of law, the decisions afford us some indirect
light.
That the legislature may change the rules of evidence in
criminal cases without violating the constitutional provision
above may be regarded as settled law, provided such
change .applies only to. acts thereafter done and does not
deny to the defendant the opportunity to present his de-
fense.
In 1915 the legislature8 sought to make the possession
of liquor seized conclusive evidence of the unlawful keep-
ing, storing and selling of the same. It was held that such
a provision violated the section of the constitution under
consideration, because to hold it valid would be to "close
the mouth of a person when he comes into court to vindi-
2 Jelly v. Dills, 27 W. Va. 267 (1885).
3 §81 of Ch. 70 of the Acts of 1915.
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cate his rights", and that "such a statute would permit a
person to be convicted without due process of law."'4
The legislatures of the various states have frequently
provided that proof that fact "A" exists shall be prima
facie proof that fact "B" exists. Such legislation is upheld
provided there is some casual or logical connection between
fact "A" and fact "B". If in truth, in logic, and in common
sense the existence of fact "A" does not even tend to prove
the existence of fact "B", then we take it no amount of
legislative dicta could make it so and a statute providing
that proof of fact "A" should be even prima facie proof of
fact "B" would be invalid. In other words, should the leg-
islature undertake to say that fact "A" shall be regarded
as proving or tending to prove fact "B", the courts would
refuse to give approval to such legislative provision if fact
"A" in logic does not tend to prove fact "B".
This, so far as our investigation discloses, is about as far
as the courts have gone or are likely to go in determining
to what extent the due process of law provision of the
constitution controls the legislature as to rules of evidence
in criminal cases and the holdings of the courts may be
summarized as follows:
No defendant can complain that he is deprived of his
liberty without due process of law so long as he is tried on
evidence the rules as to which have been enacted prior to
the commission of the act complained of; so long as there is
no incongruity between the facts proved and the inferences
authorized therefrom by statute and so long as he has had
an opportunity to present his evidence unhampered by leg-
islative restrictions and limitations destroying or tending to
destroy its probative force.
We have left out of consideration the constitutional pro-
visions against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
decisions based thereon and against self-crimination and
the decisions based thereon. They are beyond the scope
of the due process of law provision.
(2) Does legislation authorizing proof of guilt in a crim-
inal case by a mere preponderance of evidence violate Sec.
14 of Article 3 of the Constitution?
4
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It may plausibly be argued, and the argument is doubt-
less sound, that if proof of guilt in a criminal case beyond
a reasonable doubt was an inseparable incident of trial by
jury as it existed at the common law, then the legislature
could not decree that a less degree of proof is sufficient
without destroying an element of trial by jury.
Whence comes then this principle that no defendant
shall be convicted in a criminal case unless his guilt is
proved beyond.a reasonable doubt?
Unfortunately the writer has not access to the older
authorities. Greenleaf 'uses this 'language:
."In criminal cases a, rule has grown up that the per-
suasion must be beyond a reasonable doubt. This dis-
tinrtion seems to have had its origin no earlier than the
end of the eighteenth century, and to have been applied
at first only in capital cases, and by no means in a 'fixed
phrase, but in various tentative forms. "A clear impres-
sion," "upon clear grounds;" "satisfied," are the earlier
phrases; and then "rational doubt," "rational and well-
grounded doubt;" "beyond the probability of doubt,"
and ":reasonable doubt" come into use. Then, ,in Mr.
Starkie's classical treatise, "moral certainty, to the exclu-
sion of all reasonable doubt," is given vogue."5
Bearing this clear statement in mind it is apparent that
no court has ever considered proof beyond a reasonable
dodbt as an essential element of trial by a jury at the time
of the establishmelit 6f the American union.
As tending to show, if indeed not actually showing that
the legislature may pass such -a provision as has been sug-
gested, twithout violating -any constitutional limitations, it
is well vworthy of note that in State iv. Goudyc the non-support
law as it existed under the Act of 1917 was .under consid-
eration and the case appears to have been vigorously con-
tested. No question seems to have been raised as to -the
constitutionality of the provision that no greater proof shall
be required in' such cases of the -marriage of the man and
woman, orof the paternity of the child, than is required In
civil cases. The' constittitionality of the statute was not
even questioned.
SStEte v. Sixo, '77 W. Va. 248, 87 S. E. 297 (1916).
GaEiEA., EVIENCE (16th ed.), §81-c.
o 94 W. Va. 542, 119 S. E. 685 (1928).
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Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the legislation under
consideration transcendsno constitutional rule and there
is no constitutional reason why the legislature may not pro-
vide, if it sees fit, that in any criminal case evidence of the
defendant's guilt, if. it preponderates, shall, be sufficient to
warrant a conviction.
We cannot leave this subject, however, without quoting
a statement of the policy of the law:
"In criminal cases, the humanity of our law requires
that the guilt of the accused should be fully proved.
It is not sufficient that the weight of evidence points to
his guilt, but the jury must be satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt of his guilt, or he must be acquitted. It is
deemed in our law better that many guilty persons es-
cape than that one innocent person should suffer. This
maxim, obviously, is not founded upon any technical rule
or system of pleading, but is based upon broad prin-
ciples of humanity, which forbid the infliction of punish-
ment until the commission of the crime is to a reasonable
certainty established, It has received the sanction of
the- most enlightened jurists in all civilized communities,
and in all ages; and with the increasing regard for hu-
man life and individual security, it is quite apparent that
the energy of the rule is in no degree impaired. ' 7
The rule, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
like the other rulea.of evidence which the common law pro-
duced, is founded, as Mr. Greenleaf has approvingly- quot-
ed:
"In the charities of religion, in the philosophies of na-
ture, in the- truths of history, and in the experience of
common life."
It should not be destroyed by" legislative fiat.
1 R. C.. L. 218.
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